Determinants of Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice Settlements and Litigations: Evidence from Texas since 1988 by Zhou, Jun
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15  www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim  Freie Universität Berlin  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn  Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer.  Department of Economics  University of Bonn  D-53113 Bonn, 
































Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Discussion Paper No. 348 
Determinants of Noneconomic 
Damages in Medical Malpractice 
Settlements and Litigations: 





Determinants of Noneconomic Damages in Medical
Malpractice Settlements and Litigations: Evidence from
Texas since 1988
Jun Zhou, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, University of Bonn ∗†
There have long been claims that compensations for noneconomic damages are random because tort law
does not provide clear guidance regarding these compensations. I investigate, in both settled and tried
medical malpractice cases, whether noneconomic damage payments are arbitrary and what determines
the probability and size of these payments. I find that payments for noneconomic damages are not
completely random. They vary, in predictable ways, with observable characteristics of the case. The
data suggest similar patterns in non-medical malpractice cases. I end by discussing the implications of
my findings for the debate on the efficiency and rationale of noneconomic damage compensation. (JEL
K13, K32, K41)
1 Introduction
Victims of tortious injury suffer from accidents in more than financial ways. Adequate access to
justice requires that the victims be compensated fully for their losses: besides economic losses
such as medical expenses and lost earnings, also noneconomic losses such as pain, suffering and
loss of enjoyment of life should be compensated. A problem associated with such compensatory
damages is that they are difficult to quantify. For this reason, there have long been claims that
compensations for noneconomic harm are random and unpredictable. It is the purpose of this
paper to investigate in medical malpractice claims whether noneconomic damages compensa-
tions are arbitrary and what determines the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damage
∗This is a revised version of chapter 4 of the author’s Ph.D. thesis. The main part of the research was done
during the author’s Ph.D. program at the Center for Economic Research of Tilburg University. I thank the referees
for detailed and valuable comments. I benefited from conversations and suggestions about this research from Jan
Boone, David Hyman, Urs Schweizer, Jaap Abbring, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Isabel Canette, the anonymous
Ph.D. defense committee members. I am grateful to Vicky Knox at the Texas Department of Insurance, Joni
Hersch and David Hyman for patiently explaining many aspects of the data and their valuable advice on handling
the data. Special thanks go to Eric van Damme for his patient and crucially insightful supervision on this project.
Support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (No. 400-03-296) and the German Research
Foundation through SFB TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. Any mistakes are my own.
†Send correspondence to: Jun Zhou, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, University of Bonn; Adenauerallee 24-42,
53113 Bonn, Germany; Email: okonom.bonn@gmail.com
1
2payments. This is worthwhile, because the popular beliefs that noneconomic damages compen-
sations are capricious and unpredictable have made these compensations a contentious issue in
all of the various medical malpractice reforms attempts in recent years in the United States.1,2
My analysis provides the most recent evidence that these beliefs are unfounded. I begin with a
general discussion on the rationale and problem of non-economic damage compensation.
The aim of compensatory damages is to make the victim whole and restore the victim to the
position she was in before the injury, at least to the extent that monetary damages can do so.3
Compensatory damages consist of payments for both economic damages and noneconomic dam-
ages. Whereas economic damages are designed to reimburse an accident victim’s lost earnings
and medical costs, noneconomic damages are intended to compensate the victim for her physical
pain or mental anguish. The specific compensable elements of noneconomic damages vary by
jurisdiction. But generally damages are paid for bodily harm (e.g., disfigurement, disability),
emotional distress (e.g., fear, anxiety, depression, and embarrassment), and loss of enjoyment of
life (e.g., limitations on one’s lifestyle and resulting feelings).4 Therefore, noneconomic damages
encompass highly intertwined elements, many of which have psychological or social aspects.
In practice the components of noneconomic damage payments are defined in only general
ways.5 Jury instructions for noneconomic loss do not provide precise quantitative guidance.
Because of this lack of guidance, there have long been claims that noneconomic damages are
random.6 Since randomness implies variation in damage payments for individuals who suffer
identical injury, when damages are random the tort system is not horizontally fair.7
Empirical findings offer little support to the claims that compensations for noneconomic harm
are unpredictable. In an insightful paper, Viscusi (1988a) studied over 10,000 closed product
liability claims and found that noneconomic damage payments and awards vary systematically
with the economic losses, the character of injuries, and liability doctrine involved in claims.
Bovbjerg et al. (1989) studied the predictability of jury verdicts on noneconomic damages in
personal injury lawsuits from Florida and Kansas City. They categorized the injury types by
degrees of severity which were measured on a nine-point scale. They found that the juries
award the least damages for insignificant and temporary injuries and the largest for catastrophic
1In 2003, the former U.S. President Bush has urged Congress at least six times to impose substantial nationwide
restrictions on medical malpractice cases, including a cap on noneconomic damages of over $ 250,000. In his recent
health care reform, U.S. President Obama has rejected caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.
President Obama told the American Medical Association (and the American public) that medical malpractice
caps are “unfair to people who have been wrongfully harmed.” See also Kinney (1995). Kinney (1995) summarizes
federal efforts to reform noneconomic damages in the 90s.
2Proponents for restricting and eliminating non-economic damages also argue that jury awards and settlements
are too high. This paper, however, focuses on the predictability of noneconomic damages. Whether these damage
levels are appropriate is not of interest in this paper.
3See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 1979, § 901.
4See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 1979, § 905.
5This remark has been given by Wissler et al. (1997).
6See, e.g., discussions in Daniels (1989), Daniels and Martin (1995), Litan (1993), MacCoun (1993), Saks
(1992), Vidmar (1994), (1995), Weiler (1991).
7Horizontal fairness implies that individuals suffer the same degree of injury recover the same amount of
damage compensation.
3permanent injuries. However, they also found considerable unexplained variability across and
within categories of injury severity, raising the possibility that juries do not award damages
uniformly from case to case. In the same genre, the latter research by Hans and Ermann (1989),
Peterson (1984), Sloan and Hsieh (1990), Vidmar and Rice (1993), Diamond et al. (1998) and
Hyman et al. (2007), (2009) has been able to account for between half and two-thirds of the
variation in awards in sampled cases by using from just one to a small handful of explanatory
variables.
This paper shares an obvious common thread with this earlier body of work. It departs in
that, I have the unusual opportunity to analyze data on out-of-court settlements. In contrast,
Bovbjerg et al. (1989) and others have restricted their analysis to jury awards in tried cases.
The vast majority of cases are settled out-of-court in the shadow of litigation. But little is
known about the pattern of compensations for noneconomic harm in out-of-court settlement.
Moreover, there is usually a sample selection bias associated with using tried cases: the group of
court-adjudicated cases is a highly selected sample of all cases brought for damage payment. This
selection bias implies that analysis of the observed outcome – probability and size of payments at
verdict cannot be generalized to the universe of cases brought for damage compensations.8 The
present study contributes to this literature by expanding the current knowledge on noneconomic
damages and by overcoming the problems of selection bias that plague earlier studies. Using a
novel and extensive data set from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) Commercial Liability
Insurance Closed Claim Report, I provide a comprehensive prospective on the incidence and
magnitude of medical malpractice noneconomic damage payments in pre-suit settlements, post-
suit and pre-judgment settlements, and cases went through full trial. I analyze the relationship
of these payments to other characteristics of the case and obtain four main findings:
(a) Consistent with the prior research, I find that noneconomic damage payments are not
completely random outcomes. They vary, in predictable ways, with changes in the observ-
able characteristics of the case: the level of the victim’s economic damages is the single
best predictor of noneconomic damages, accounting for 64 percent and 26 percent of the
variance in the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages, respectively;
(b) The incidence of noneconomic damage payment is plausibly related to the stage at which
the dispute is resolved.9Cases resolved in pre-suit settlements tend to receive noneco-
nomic damages more frequently than in post-suit settlements. After reaching a verdict, a
claimant’s chance of receiving noneconomic damages drops by 21 percent as compared to
settling prior to a verdict. These results suggest that the various aspects of the litigation
process, such as litigation costs and the chances that the defendant could lose at trial, da-
8See Priest and Klein (1984) for discussion on sample selection bias associated with litigated cases. See
Viscusi (1988b) and Danzon and Lillard (1983) for similar critiques on using court verdict as a proxy for expected
settlement payment. Using data on Texas medical malpractice for the years 1988-2003, Hyman et al. (2007)
find large and statistically significant difference between jury verdicts and actual post-verdict payouts, providing
the latest evidence that information on jury verdicts is misleading for drawing conclusions about the pattern of
damage payment in settlements and litigations.
4mpen the defendant’s bargaining position vis-a`-vis the claimant in the damage negotiation;
(c) For the majority of cases settled out-of-court and the minority of litigated cases, the
probability and size of noneconomic damage payment are higher for unemployed or self-
employed victims than for employed ones; and they are higher from organizational de-
fendants (hospitals) than from individual defendants (physicians and surgeons). Because
damage negotiations take place in the shadow of litigation, we can draw inferences about
the potential court verdicts with information gleaned from the settled cases: When award-
ing noneconomic damages the courts have objectives other than merely making whole the
victims for their physical and mental anguish;
(d) The incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages are not systematically related to
injuries. Permanent and catastrophic injuries do not necessarily receive more noneconomic
damages than temporary, insignificant injuries. This lack of systematic variation raises
serious questions about the equity of tort system. But the possibility remains that this
absence of systematical relationship could have resulted from differences among cases that
I did not examine and the lack of a precise measure of the seriousness of injury that the
victims have suffered as a consequence of the medical malpractice.
The analysis of noneconomic damages in non-medical malpractice cases provides further evi-
dence of the remarkable sameness of predictability in payments across different contexts. Taken
together, my analysis of this extensive data set provides a view on noneconomic damage com-
pensation that is at odds with the public perceptions that noneconomic damages are random.
However, the cries of alarm regarding the magnitudes of noneconomic damages may not be
misplaced.
Although my sampling method is largely based on Hyman et al. (2007), (2008a), (2008b)
and Black et al. (2005), (2008), the present study employs more timely data. In discussing the
limitation of the data and determining the relevant variables for my empirical analysis, I have
freely borrowed from the insightful earlier research of Hyman et al. (2007), (2008a), (2008b),
Hersch and Viscusi (2007), Hersch et al. (2007) and Black et al. (2005), (2008). The description
of the TDI data, even though only slightly different from the descriptions found in these earlier
works, is given as an aid to the reader.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the provision of noneconomic damages in
the US legal system and briefly reviews the noneconomic damages reforms. Section 3 provides
an overview of the noneconomic damage payments in medical malpractice cases by injury type.
Section 4 describes estimation methods. Section 5 presents empirical results on noneconomic
damage payments in medical malpractice cases. Noneconomic damages vary substantially, but
not completely randomly, within and among different injury types. One source of variation
9Viscusi (1988) finds that cases settled out-of-court tend to receive less pain and suffering payment than
the expected court award. Other empirical studies that investigate the relationship between disposition and
indemnity payments but not only noneconomic damages payments include Sloan and Hsieh (1990) and Danzon
and Lillard (1983).
5is the stage of the disposition of the case, which is the focus of Section 6. Section 7 provides
evidence that the predictability of noneconomic damage compensation is not confined to medical
malpractice cases, but are a robust feature across different contexts of bodily injury claims.
Section 8 presents summary measures of the efficiency of the tort system for medical malpractice
claims in the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim
database. I estimate that, under plausible assumptions, the legal costs share of total damage
payments average about 0.59 for all claims involve noneconomic damage payments. This ratio
is somewhat higher for cases without noneconomic damage payments. Furthermore, I find that
the tort system is more efficient in compensating noneconomic losses for fatal injury and serious
injury types than for temporary, insignificant injuries. Section 9 concludes.
2 Legal Background
2.1 Provision of Noneconomic Damages
In the US, noneconomic damages are provided extensively through the tort law system, but
only moderately by insurance markets.10 In the American tort system, noneconomic damages
are estimated by the juries, influenced by the effort of the lawyers and eventually modified and
approved by the courts.
Juries are often urged to “reasonably compensate” the victims for noneconomic losses.11
However, what compensation is reasonable and the objectives that are to be promoted by this
compensation have not been well defined. Standard jury instructions sometimes explicitly state
that there are no objective guidelines by which the jury can follow to measure the money equiv-
alent of noneconomic losses (see Douthwaite 1988, page 274). Furthermore, as Vidmar and Rice
(1993) and others have observed, since juries are ad hoc groups of lay persons familiar only with
the case at hand, they are not aware of the level of awards in similar cases with which to compare
and adjust their damage assessment.
As a result, lawyers have tried to offer a number of heuristic devices to help juries quantify
noneconomic losses. However, courts have often rejected these attempts. Some jurisdictions in
the US forbid the jurors to use the “per diem” method, where the jury awards the victim a
small amount per unit of time (such as a day or an hour) and then multiplies it by the victim’s
life expectancy.12 The reasons of prohibition are that assuming the noneconomic loss suffered
10There are different explanations for the absence of an insurance market for noneconomic loss. For instance,
Suurmond and Van Velthoven (2005) shows that there is a lack of demand for insurance for noneconomic damages:
even if noneconomic losses would be fully compensated - a risk averse individual would never purchase insurance
against the risk of incurring noneconomic losses. Croley and Hanson (1995) argue that there is a lack of supply
of insurance. They show that market failures, such as moral hazard, would prohibit insurance companies from
selling insurance for noneconomic damages.
11For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979, § 912) particularly notes: “The discretion of the judge
or jury determines the amount of recovery, the only standard being such an amount as a reasonable person would
estimate as fair compensation.”
12See Pearson (2005) and McCaffery et al. (1995).
6by the victims is additive over each time interval is at best an approximation to the true value;
In addition, it begs the fundamental issue of what each unit of noneconomic loss is worth.13
Courts have similarly rejected the “Golden Rule” which asks jurors to determine the amount
of compensation they need to receive (ex post) if they had to experience the victims’ pain and
suffering. The reason of rejection is that the courts think the “Golden rule” approach is too
clearly based on nonobjective factors: it is impermissible in virtually every jurisdiction to ask
jurors to imagine themselves in the circumstances of the victim and to use that visualization in
determining the level of noneconomic damages (Boucher 2008, page 169). Yet some jurisdictions
in the US allow jurors to use the “per diem” approach. Similarly, “day-in-the-life” videos are
admissible in courts if they are carefully prepared (Varner and McGee 1999). Once the jury
determines the amount of damage, the court may reduce the amount via a remittitur process,14
or because there are statutory caps under which the court must adjust the jury award.15
2.2 Noneconomic Damages Reforms
The claims that noneconomic damages are random have made these damage components the
subject of much legislation and continuing suggestions for further modifications of the legal
system in order to limit or prohibit noneconomic damage payments. As early as in 1975, the
California Legislature has enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”)
and limited at $250,000 the amount of noneconomic damages that a plaintiff could recover at
a medical malpractice trial.16 In 1986, the U.S. Department of Justice Tort Policy Working
Group reported that noneconomic damages were subjective awards and are unpredictable and
that the magnitude of these awards was so substantial that a cap was needed.17 In 2003, former
US President Bush proposed a nationwide $250, 000 cap on all noneconomic damages paid in
medical malpractice lawsuits. Following the proposal seven states passed legislation or amended
their constitutions to create caps on noneconomic damages. Texas, for instance, established a
tree-tiered system for awarding noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases in 2003 (see
House Bill 4, Texas Legislature (2003)). A $250,000 cap applies to all doctors involved in a
case, with a $250,000 cap against any single institution and a $500,000 cap on all health-care
institutions combined.18 By 2007, 26 states in the US have imposed caps on non-economic
13For discussion of this point, see Viscusi (1988a). Totaro (2006) makes a similar remark.
14A remittitur process is a legal process which allows a judge to reduce a jury award if the judge believes that
the amount is not supported by the facts and that it is excessive.
15See Avraham (2010) for detailed and comprehensive review of noneconomic damages reforms in the United
States between 1980 and 2008.
16See, e.g., Studdert et al. (2004) and Pace et al. (2004) for description of the MICRA and the effect of
noneconomic damages cap.
17See U.S. Department of Justice Tort Policy Working Group, Report (February 1986).
18Reforms in the other states are as follows. Florida imposed caps on noneconomic damages for medical
negligence at $ 500,000 for physicians and $ 750,000 for hospitals; West Virginia capped noneconomic damages
at $ 250,000 per occurrence; $ 500,000 per occurrence for wrongful death, permanent and substantial deformity,
loss of limb or bodily function; Colorado extended its pre-existing $ 250,000 cap on noneconomic damages for
medical negligence cases to cases of physical impairment and disfigurement. Ohio capped noneconomic damages
at $ 250,000 or three times economic damages to a maximum of $ 350,000 per victim or $ 500,000 per occurrence.
7damages (Bustos and Avraham 2008, page 2). During this period, noneconomic damage caps
were struck down by supreme courts in five states. In some states, such as Illinois and Ohio, caps
were struck down by state supreme courts and later reenacted in amended form. Sometimes this
cycle repeated itself.19
The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis about the predictability of noneco-
nomic damages payments:
Hypothesis Noneconomic damage payments are entirely random events.
3 Descriptive Statistics
The data to be used in this study are drawn from the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI)
Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim Report.20 I focus primarily on medical malpractice
cases. Texas requires detailed reports of all commercial claims involving damage payments by all
defendants for bodily injury that are at least $10,000 in nominal dollars. A rich variety of case-
specific information is recorded for the majority of claims, including payments for noneconomic
damages and stages of case position which are the key variables of interest in this paper. TDI used
two reporting forms: a “Short Form” for claims for which the damage payments for bodily injury
are of $ 10,000-$25,000 (nominal), and a “Long Form” for claims for which damage payments
for bodily injury are at least $25,000 (nominal). The “Long Form” contains information on the
type of injury and victim’s age and employment status that is omitted on the ‘Short Form”. I
analyze data from all available years, which currently include the years 1988-2008.21
Sample Selection for Medical Malpractice Cases. While the TDI data is rich, it still has
limitations that make necessary several restrictions on the set of cases included in my sample.
First, following Black et al. (2005), (2008) and Hyman et al. (2007), (2008a), (2008b) the
data were sampled to obtain only those observations that satisfy at least two of the following
criteria: (i) The claim was covered by medical professional liability insurance; (ii) The claim
was against a health care practitioner or institution (physician, surgeon, hospital, or nursing
home); (iii) The claim was associated with injuries caused by complications or misadventures
of medical or surgical care. I further exclude claims against dentists or oral surgeons from the
sample. Secondly, I restrict the sample to “Long Form” reports because information on key
Oklahoma capped noneconomic damages at $ 300,000 in cases involving pregnancy.
19See Avraham (2006a) for a comprehensive survey on noneconomic damages reforms in the US. See also
Bovbjerg (1989); National Conference of State Legislatures (1988); Sanders and Joyce (1990) for legislations on
noneconomic damages.
20For a comprehensive description of the database see, e.g., Black et al. (2005).
21Unless otherwise specified, all dollar values throughout the paper are adjusted to 2008$ using standard
measure of general price trends published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers.
8variables, such as victim’s age and employment status, is missing from the “Short Form”.22 Due
to this restriction, 1,571 medical malpractice claims are dropped. Duplicate reports relating to
the same underlying claim and filed in the same year further reduce the number of sampled
observations.23 Because of these restrictions, the resulting sample of 18,834 medical malpractice
claims contains 6,169 claims with positive noneconomic damages payments and 12,665 claims
with no noneconomic damage payment. I refer to the sample of 18,834 claims as my med mal
sample.
Data limitations. My analysis is subject to at least four important data limitations. The
primary limitation of the data is that the allocations between economic and noneconomic dam-
ages in settled cases are reported allocations, not actual allocations. The allocation is recorded
in the data set by the insurer rather than by a neutral party.24 To the extent that the insur-
ance companies might provide biased allocations, the noneconomic damage measure used here
should be regarded more as a proxy for noneconomic damage payment rather than a highly
refined and specific measure of it.25 Calculations (not reported in the table) based on the med
mal sample show that reported non-economic damages comprise 31 percent of total settlement
amounts. This ratio is somewhat lower than that reported in Studdert et al.’s (2007) review of
all available studies of the fraction of payment for noneconomic damages.26 The purpose of my
analysis is primarily to capture factors that drive the differences in the incidence and magnitude
of noneconomic damages. My analysis could clearly be improved if data on the actual allocations
between economic and noneconomic damages were available.
The second limitation is that the TDI data set does not contain information on three impor-
tant variables: a refined measure of the seriousness of injury, the victim’s income and gender.27
These variables have been shown to be important determinants of noneconomic damage awards
and payments (see, e.g., Peterson 1984, Viscusi 1988a, Sloan and Hsieh 1990, Vidma et al. 1999).
They have also been shown to be associated, in significant ways, with other characteristics of
the case (see, e.g., Peterson 1984, Viscusi 1986, Vidmar et al. 2006). Omission of these variables
could well bias some of the estimated effects of other variables in my empirical analysis. To
remedy at least in part the potential model misspecification bias, I include an economic loss
variable and a series of injury type variables as crude measures of the seriousness of injury.
Furthermore, it can be argued that income and gender are relevant variables in explaining the
variations in noneconomic losses only in that people who do not work outside the home, like
22Numerous previous research (see, e.g., Viscusi 1988, Rodgers 1993 and Avraham 2005) has suggested that
these variables are important determinants of the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages compensa-
tions.
23737 duplicate reports filed in the same year are dropped.
24Black et al. (2010) have noted that one can rely on insurer’s allocation in the TDI data.
25For a discussion on insurance companies’ incentive to understate economic losses, see Viscusi (1988a).
26Studdert et al. (2007) review all available studies of the fraction of noneconomic damages and estimate that
noneconomic damages average about 40 percent of total damages.
27The remark that the TDI data set lacks information on injury severity and gender first appeared in Hyman
et al. (2008a).
9women and children, tend to receive more noneconomic damage payments as a compensation for
less economic damage payments. The empirical analysis includes an employment status variable
to remedy at least in part the potential model misspecification bias associated with the omission
of victim gender and income.
The third data limitation is related to missing observations. The TDI data set does not
contain claims against self-insured providers.28 Although most physicians carry malpractice
insurance, hospitals do not. As a consequence, information on claims against the University of
Texas hospital system and University of Texas employed physicians is missing from the TDI
data set. Furthermore, no data source is available that would allow me to estimate how many
claims are outside the TDI data set.
Finally, I do not have enough reliable information to identify and eliminate duplicate reports
filed in different years. Identifying duplicate claims across different years necessarily requires
information on the date of injury, victim’s age, county, and claim amount paid by insurers
contributing to the claim. Therefore, the success in finding all the duplicates is directly reliant
on the accuracy of data provided by the insurance companies. When reports associated with the
same underlying claim do not have the same injury dates, ages, or counties, it becomes difficult
to ascertain the duplicates.29
Due to these data limitations, my results may best be interpreted with caution.
Noneconomic damage payments for different injury types. The variables and model
parameters are defined in Table 1, and the corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in
Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reports the distribution of noneconomic damage payments for different
injuries. Because only a small fraction of plaintiffs (3 percent) have multiple injuries, it is possible
to determine, for the majority of cases, specific compensation for each injury. The results are
striking in terms of the importance of noneconomic losses in total indemnity payment. Nearly
one-third of all accident victims receive noneconomic damages compensation. The effect of
noneconomic losses is particularly prevalent for systemic poisoning (toxic) victims, as more than
half of these victims received noneconomic damage compensation.
The average amount of noneconomic damage payment, which includes cases with payments
exceeding $25,000 but not necessarily a noneconomic component, ranges from a low value of
$ 6,528 for scarring to a high value of $ 328,815 for brain damages. There is substantially less
variation in the fraction of the payment comprised by noneconomic damages. The third column
in Table 2 shows that noneconomic damages comprise from 12 percent to 31 percent of total
tort damages paid for medical cases in which payments exceed $25,000. Therefore, for none of
the injury categories noneconomic damages comprise a dominant share of the compensation. It
28This limitation was previously discussed in Hyman et al. (2008a).
29I am grateful to Vicky Knox for pointing out this difficulty in verifying the accuracy of data for identifying
duplicates. Hyman et al. (2007), (2008) and Black et al. (2005), (2008) tried to identify and eliminate duplicate
reports of different years in the TDI data set in their studies.
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Table 1. Terms and Definitions30
Definition
Claim (“case” is a synonym) An incident that leads to bodily injury and results in a request to an
insurer(s) by a policyholder(s) for coverage.
Noneconomic Damages Damages to be paid for the purpose of compensating a victim for phys-
ical pain and suffering, mental or emotional pain or anguish, loss of
consortium, disfigurement, physical impairment, loss of companion-
ship and society, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to




It equals the total amount of noneconomic damage payments by all
defendants, if the claim is resolved in pre-suit settlement, post-suit
and pre-verdict settlement, or post-verdict settlement; It equals the




Indicator with value 1 if AMOUNT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE
PAYMENT is positive, 0 otherwise.
AMOUNT OF NONECONOMIC
DAMAGE AWARD
Court award on the level of noneconomic damages for cases resolved
at court-verdict, settled after verdict or appeal filed.
INCIDENCE OF NONECO-
NOMIC DAMAGE AWARD
Indicator with value 1 if AMOUNT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE
AWARD is positive, 0 otherwise.
ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAY-
MENT
The total amount of economic damage payments by all defendants, if
the case is resolved in pre-suit, post-suit and pre-verdict, or post-
verdict settlement; It equals the amount of economic damage awards
if the case is terminated at court verdict.
ECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARD Court award on the amount of economic damages for cases resolved at
court-verdict, settled after verdict or appeal filed.
EMPLOYED Indicator with value 1 if the victim is employed outside of the home;
0 if the victim is unemployed or self-employed
AGE GROUP Categorical variable indicating the age group to which the plaintiff
belong. These age groups are children (age 0 - 18 years), adult
non-elderly (age 19-64 years) and elderly (age 65+).
DISPOSITION Categorical variable indicating the legal stage at which a claim is termi-
nated. The stages are pre-suit settlement, post-suit and pre-verdict
settlement, and full trial;
DEFENDANT TYPE Categorical variable indicating the type of defendant. The types are
physicians and surgeons, hospital, nursing home, and other defen-
dants;
INJURY TYPE Categorical variable indicating the type(s) of injury associated with
the claim. The injury types are fatalities, nonfatal serious injuries
(brain damage, spinal cord injury, and amputation) and nonfatal
other injuries (injuries that are not fatal, brain damage, spinal cord
injury, or amputation).
30The definition of noneconomic damages is from Texas Statutes Civil Practice & Remedies Code, Chapter
41: Damages, Section 41.001(12). Pre-suit settlement corresponds to “alternative dispute resolution: no suit”
and “no suit filed” in the TDI data set; post-suit and pre-verdict settlement corresponds to “alternative dispute
11
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Overall distribution of noneconomic damage payment in medical malpractice claims with indemnity payments > $250,000 (nominal)a
All Med Mal Claims with Med Mal Claims with Positive
Bodily Injury Payments > $ 250,000 (nominal) Noneconomic Damages Payment
Fraction of Mean Fraction of Mean Median Fraction of
Cases with Noneconomic Payment for Noneconomic Noneconomic Payment for
Noneconomic Damages Noneconomic Damages Damages Noneconomic
Type of Injury Damage payment Payment Damages Observations Payment Payment Damages Observations
Death 0.32 109,615 0.21 6,682 340,255 195,000 0.65 2,152
Amputation 0.33 105,527 0.19 469 319,303 120,000 0.58 155
Burns (heat) 0.44 81,670 0.28 177 187,734 53,000 0.65 77
Burns (chemical) 0.34 60,687 0.21 76 177,393 66,141 0.62 26
Systemic poisoning (toxic) 0.54 109,242 0.39 48 201,678 74,250 0.72 26
Systemic poisoning (other) 0.47 110,980 0.31 83 236,188 135,900 0.65 39
Eye injury (blindness) 0.34 85,989 0.22 509 251,009 144,000 0.63 173
Respiratory condition 0.35 76,979 0.21 212 217,593 150,000 0.59 75
Nervous condition 0.41 100,326 0.24 145 242,455 90,500 0.57 60
Hearing loss or impairment 0.33 204,496 0.21 104 625,516 146,918 0.65 34
Circulatory condition 0.37 85,284 0.21 279 228,790 100,000 0.57 104
Multiple injuries 0.32 42,604 0.18 566 133,730 60,000 0.56 180
Back injury 0.25 43,925 0.12 458 174,553 54,000 0.50 115
Skin disorder 0.36 71,737 0.21 251 19,708 90,000 0.58 91
Brain damage 0.34 328,815 0.17 1,756 97,644 405,000 0.51 591
Scarring 0.40 6,528 0.24 454 163,357 68,000 0.61 181
Spinal cord injuries 0.29 191,622 0.14 448 670,675 235,710 0.50 128
Other 0.32 67,351 0.20 7,648 207,878 75,000 0.61 2,475
All injury types 0.33 107,187 0.20 18,834 327,241 120,000 0.61 6,169
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for medical
malpractice claims with indemnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value.







































































































is noteworthy that the noneconomic portion of payments for catastrophic permanent injuries,
such as amputation (19%), brain damages (17%) and spinal cord injuries (14%), are lower than
those for some of the minor temporary injuries, such as skin disorder (21%).
It should be noted that my calculation of the noneconomic damage portion of payment is
inconsistent with the estimates of Hersch et al. (2007) and Black et al. (2009) based on the
TDI data.31 The source of the inconsistency is that insurers allocate noneconomic damages for
only about 35 percent of settled cases. I use, as Hersch et al. (2007) and Black et al. (2009) do,
the insurers’ allocation where it is provided. Where it is not, instead of accepting the insurers’
allocation, Hersch et al. (2007) and Black et al. (2009) impute the noneconomic damages. In
contrast, I accept the insurers’ allocation and provide evidence that the absence of noneconomic
damages is systematically related to the characteristics of the case (see Section 5).
These figures regarding the role of noneconomic damages may understate the importance
of these concerns in the cases in which they arise. The statistics in the final columns of Table
2 address the noneconomic damages contribution excluding cases where noneconomic damage
payments are zero, and the noneconomic portion of damage payment increases by more than 35
percent in most cases. The mean values of noneconomic damage payment now exceed $600, 000 in
two cases – hearing loss or impairment and spinal cord injuries. In 2008 dollars these noneconomic
damages amounts exceed $300, 000 as an average for the injury category. The levels of payment
for hearing loss or impairment and spinal cord injuries should be regarded as very extreme outliers
rather than the norm. In 13 out the 18 injury categories in which there is a positive payment
for noneconomic damages, the level of such payment is below $250, 000. One may conclude
therefore, based on the levels of payments observed, that noneconomic damage amounts are
large in absolute terms and salient differences exist across injury categories.
A rather different perspective is provided by the statistics in the second-last column of Table
2, however. For cases in which there are positive noneconomic damage payments, the average
share of compensation for noneconomic losses is about 50 percent for most of the injuries. These
statistics are noteworthy for two reasons. First, the contribution of noneconomic damages to
total indemnity payment is markedly high. Noneconomic damages are not a minor addendum
but are an eminent component of compensation in cases where the noneconomic damage amounts
are positive. Second, there is a dense clustering of the noneconomic damage share, which ranges
from 0.57 to 0.65 for thirteen of the eighteen injury categories. These observations are roughly
consistent with a situation in which indemnity payments are simply increased by 2.5 times in
situations in which noneconomic damages are of consequence. There is no obvious legal or
economic justification for scaling up payments by such a coarse rule of thumb. The analysis in
the following sections investigates whether the implications of these descriptive statistics reflect
31Black et al. (2009) estimate that noneconomic damages comprise 52 percent of total damages in settled
cases. Hersch et al. (2007) impute percentages of noneconomic damages ranging from 64 percent to 85 percent
of total damages. For a debate regarding the estimation of noneconomic damage ratios, see Black et al. (2010)
and Hersch et al. (2010).
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the way that noneconomic damages are determined. In particular, in addition to economic losses
what other factors may help to account for the variations in noneconomic damage payments?
Column 6 of Table 2 reports the median values of noneconomic damage payment for cases
with positive noneconomic damages compensation. Because of the skewed distribution of the
payment, for most of the injury categories the median values are below the means. For example,
for all injury categories the median noneconomic damage payment is $ 120,000 as compared to
the mean value of $ 327,241.
As a final note on this descriptive statistics analysis, there aren’t many systemic poisoning
(toxic) and systemic poisoning (toxic) cases. Conclusion about the magnitude and percentage
role of noneconomic damages in these cases may be best drawn with caution. The same goes for
burns (chemical) and hearing loss/impairment. It should be noted also that a high percentage
of cases fall into the “other” category – 7,648 of the 18,834 cases reported in Table 2 – for which
the nature of injury is unknown.
Explanatory Variables. Three sets of explanatory variables are employed in the analysis to
account for possible variations in the factors that might affect the incidence and magnitude of
noneconomic damages. A first set of variables captures the economic characteristics of the claim.
The economic losses paid for the victim’s medical expenses and lost earnings, ECONOMIC
DAMAGE PAYMENT, provides a case-specific measure of the severity of injury. Obviously,
more severe injuries are associated with higher medical expenses and lost working hours.32
ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT has relatively high explanatory power in predicting the
noneconomic damage payments. A regression of AMOUNT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE
PAYMENT on ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT yields a coefficient of 0.85 (t-value = 53.37),
demonstrating that on average, noneconomic losses track economic losses closely. Furthermore,
the pseudo R-squared in this equation is 0.013, showing that there is a large proportion of
variation across cases in the level of noneconomic damages for any given economic damages
amount. Several studies have shown positive correlation between noneconomic and economic
losses, which include loss of income and sometimes property damages (see, e.g., Viscusi 1988,
Rodgers 1993, Croley and Hanson 1995, Avraham 2005, Hyman et al. 2007, 2009).
The next variable, EMPLOYED, indicates whether the victim is employed outside of the
home. Employment status is often an important determinant of the incidence and level of
noneconomic damages in juror’s decision making. As employment income forms the basis for
calculating most economic damage payments, noneconomic loss becomes an important element
of compensation for people who do not work outside the home, like retired seniors, children, and
homemakers. The victims are employed in 40% of the cases in my sample.
A second set of variables pertains to the disposition of the case – whether the claim was
settled before filing of lawsuit, settled after filing of lawsuit but before reaching a verdict, or we-
32Viscusi (1988) and Rodgers (1993) made similar remarks that claims involving large economic losses are likely
to be particularly severe injuries.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Economic Variables
ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT ($ ) 57,728 350,983
EMPLOYED (1=yes) 0.40 0.49
N %
Disposition
Pre-suit settlement 1,459 7.75
Post-suit & pre-judgment settlement 16,888 89.67
Full trial 487 2.59
Age Group
Children 2,980 15.82
Adult non elderly 8,849 46.98
Elderly 7,005 37.19
Defendant Type
Physicians and surgeons 14,044 74.57
Hospital 3,030 16.09
Nursing home 972 5.16
Other defendants 788 4.18
Injury Type
Fatalities 6,602 35.05
Nonfatal Serious Injuries 2,637 14.00
Other Nonfatal Injuries 9,595 50.95
Observations 18,834
a. all dollar values are in 2008$ . The source for these values is author’s calculations
based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed
Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for claims with indemnity payments of at least
$25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same
year are excluded; duplicate reports filed in different years are not identified and elim-
inated.
nt through full trial. Danzon and Lillard (1983), Viscusi (1986) and Huang et al. (2009) provide
evidence, based on independent data sources, that cases that proceed to verdict are not simply
more severe injuries. They differ in character from settled cases as well. Using data on medical
malpractice claims with payouts of at least $ 1,000,000, Vidmar et al. (2006) found statistically
significant differences in the severity of injury, the level of damage payments, and the type of
defendant between pre-suit and post-verdict settlements. In my med mal sample, Claims with
suit filed but settled prior to a verdict make up the overwhelming majority (89.67%) of cases.
It is noteworthy that 7.75 percent settlements involve payments of at least $25,000 dollars were
made closed without a lawsuit being filed.
A third set of variables captures the individual characteristics of the case. I include a cat-
egorical variable, AGE GROUP, to control for the potential effect of victim’s age that may
be associated with both damage payment and the included variables of interest. I chose the
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subsamples based on the characteristics that are likely to predict differences in the incidence
and magnitude of noneconomic damages across victims’ ages, while requiring the number of
observations in each age category to be sufficiently large.33
The probability and size of noneconomic damage payment may also hinge on whether the
defendant is an organization or an individual. There is a wide-spread perception that America’s
tort system is biased against so-called “deep-pocket” defendants – defendants such as organi-
zations with extensive financial resources. This is reflected in the results of Chin and Peterson
(1985), where Cook County juries are found to award significantly more money in cases with
organizational defendants than in cases with individual defendants. DEFENDANT TYPE is a
categorical variable indicating whether the defendant is a hospital, a nursing home, a physician
or a surgeon, or of other types. The variable is included to control for the potential differences
in the noneconomic damage payments collected from different types of defendant.
The final variables to be considered are the types of injury. They are characterized through
a series of three injury categories, where the “other nonfatal injuries” group is the one excluded
dummy variable.34 Injury type is intended as a proxy for the severity of injury, on the assumption
that injury types and seriousness are correlated. A drawback to this measure might arise if injury
types in some cases reflect the presenting symptoms rather than the consequence of malpractice.
4 Empirical Models
Two aspects of noneconomic damage payment – the likelihood that a victim receives noneco-
nomic damages and the amount of noneconomic damage payment – merit further empirical
investigation. In particular, I will isolate compensation for particular types of injuries from ef-
fects such as differing victim characteristics (e.g., employment status and age) and differences in
the size of the economic losses (e.g., earning loss, medical expenses, etc.) associated with differ-
ent injury categories. Using the same empirical strategy as that in Viscusi (1988a), I estimate
two equations for the case sample. The first is for the level of noneconomic damage payment,
and the second is for the incidence of noneconomic damage payment. The equations include the
same explanatory variables.
Let the estimated value of noneconomic losses be given by
[Noneconomic Damages]i = x
′
iβ + ǫi, (1)
for each observation i. xi is a vector of observed explanatory variables. The parameter vector β
is the vector of coefficients, measuring the influence of observed characteristics.
33Hyman et al. (2009) adopted a similar age classification when estimating the impact of noneconomic damages
cap on payouts in tried and settled cases. Black et al. (2009) used a similar age classification when estimating the
effect of a earlier offer rules on payouts in medical malpractice cases. I obtain similar results with other plausible
choices of age categories in the robustness checks.
34Hersch et al. (2007) adopted the same injury type classification.
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The likelihood of receiving noneconomic damage payment is given by
Prob[Noneconomic Damages]i = Prob{[Noneconomic Damages]i − ǫi > 0} (2)
where the observed noneconomic damages variable equals 1 if the estimated noneconomic dam-
ages are positive and 0 otherwise.
Two statistical issues immediately arise. The first statistical issue involves estimation of the
equation for the amount of noneconomic damage payments. Using OLS to analyze the nonzero
damage payment responses would yield biased estimates. The problem is that the dependent
variable is censored from below, with no observations for it if noneconomic damage payments are
not positive. In this case, the relationship defined by equation (1) can be consistently estimated
using the Tobit estimator (see Maddala, 1983).
The second statistical issue is that the dependent variable estimated in (2) has a binary
nature. Estimating (2) using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods could lead to biased esti-
mates of the coefficients. Assuming that the error term follows a normal distribution, the probit
estimator yield unbiased estimates of the probability response and will be used here.
5 Empirical Evidence
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 report the regression estimates of the incidence and magnitude
of noneconomic damage payments, respectively. Our key interest is on the predictability of
these payments. Column 1 of Table 4 reports the probit regression results for the incidence of
noneconomic damage payments; Column 2 of Table 4 reports the tobit regression estimates for
the log of noneconomic damage payment levels. The level of economic damage payment is also
in terms of natural logs so that the coefficients in equation (1) equal the pertinent elasticities.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that there are nine variables that affect or are associated
with, in a significant way, the incidence of payments for noneconomic harm; and there are
seven variables that affect or are associated with, in a significant way, the level of payments.
The explanatory variables account for nearly two-third of the variability in the incidence of
payments and more than one-quarter of the variability in the level of payments, respectively. One
can therefore reject the hypothesis that noneconomic damage payments in medical malpractice
cases are entirely random outcomes. These results cast doubt on the validity of the claim that
payment for noneconomic harm are random and unpredictable.
The estimates in Table 4 also show that the specific factors that affect noneconomic damages
compensation. Consider first the economic variables. Cases with higher economic losses are
more likely to receive noneconomic damages, and if they do the amount of such compensation is
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Table 4. Estimates of Noneconomic damage equations for Medical Malpractice Claimsa
Probit Tobit
INCIDENCE OF Log(1+ AMOUNT OF
NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC
Independent DAMAGE PAYMENT DAMAGE PAYMENT)
Variable (N = 18, 834) (N = 18, 834)




Pre-suit settlement 0.297∗∗ 0.561
(0.107) (0.438)


















Pseudo R-Squared 0.6652 0.2661
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Omitted disposition is full trial; Omitted age group is
adult non-elderly; Omitted defendant type is other defendants. Omitted injury type is other nonfatal
injuries. * significant at 5 percent level; ** significant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability In-
surance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for claims with indemnity payments of at least
$25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are exclude;
duplicate reports filed in different years are not identified and eliminated.
higher.
Claims involving large financial losses tend to be particularly severe injuries, and one would
expect such injuries to receive more compensation for the nonmonetary losses associated with
an injury. Furthermore, because the dependent variables were expressed as natural logarithms,
the coefficient in the first model (reported in column 2 of Table 4) for ECONOMIC DAMAGE
PAYMENT represents the elasticities of the level of noneconomic damage payments with respect
to changes in economic damages. Thus, noneconomic damage payments increase with economic
damages, as expected, and the elasticity of that is more than unity. This is plausible – more
serious injuries are probably associated with higher levels of medical expenses and lost working
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hours and, presumably, greater pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. One caveat to this
interpretation is raised by the lack of control for victim’s wage: My model cannot determine
whether a victim receives higher economic damages compensation because she suffers more severe
injury or simply that she was hired at a higher wage rate prior to the injury.
The incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damage payments are significantly higher for
unemployed or self-employed victims than for employed ones. This is consistent with the view
that noneconomic compensation is more important to those who do not work outside the home,
such as the elderly, children, and homemakers. That’s because victims who do not work outside
their homes cannot collect a lost wages portion of economic damages. The “worth” of a home-
maker’s work inside the home is not easily measured by a dollar amount, and would only be
compensated through noneconomic damages.
The probability of receiving noneconomic damage payments is significantly related to the
stage at which the dispute is resolved. Cases litigated to verdict are 35 percent (exp{0.297}−1 ≈
35%) less likely to receive noneconomic damages than cases resolved in pre-suit settlements; and
21 percent (exp{0.191} − 1 ≈ 21%) less likely to receive noneconomic damages than cases with
suits filed but settled before verdict. These results indicate that the various aspects of the
litigation process, such as litigation costs and the chance that the defendant will lose at trial,
dampen the defendant’ bargaining position vis-a`-vis the claimant and increase the frequency of
noneconomic damage payment in pre-verdict settlements. Earlier stages of disposition are also
associated with higher payments. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant at
conventional level.
Turning to the effect of AGE GROUP, the omitted category for “adult non elderly” provides
the reference point. Thus, the failure of any specific age category to exhibit a positive and
significant coefficient does not imply that there is no noneconomic damages compensation for
victims of that age category. Rather, it indicates that there is no differential in the compensation
when compared with the omitted category. The age category receiving the highest incidence and
magnitude of noneconomic damage compensation, controlling for influences such as employment
status and economic loss level, is elderly individuals. This is perhaps because elderly people are
expected to recover slower and therefore suffer longer from an injury than younger individuals.
The presence of some significant defendant type variables influences is consistent with the
“deep pockets” hypothesis (Chin and Peterson 1985), as is the direction of the effects. An
injured party are twice (exp{0.427 + 0.240} ≈ 2) more likely to succeed in claiming damages
from a hospital (usually an organization with extensive financial resources) than from a physician
or surgeon (an individual with typically less resources than hospitals); and when the injured does
succeed, the amount of payments collected from the hospital is nearly 15 times (exp{1.578 +
1.185} ≈ 15) higher than that from the physician or surgeon.
Noneconomic damages seem to vary with an unexpected pattern with injury types, however.
Permanent and catastrophic injuries such as brain damages, spinal cord injuries and amputations
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are not the leading injury category receiving the largest noneconomic damages payments. The
absence of systematical relationship could be due to some unmeasured difference in the type of
cases that involved catastrophic injuries versus non-catastrophic injuries (e.g., differences in the
severity of injuries, lawyers’ bargaining skills or trial strategies).
6 Noneconomic Damages by Stages of Disposition
6.1 Noneconomic damage payments by stages of disposition
I decompose the med mal sample into three subsamples for each stage of the disposition of the
case to investigate which stages are associated with higher damage payments and to account for
possible differences in the pattern of damage compensation.
Table 5 summarizes the noneconomic damage payments by stages of disposition. In terms of
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics: Distribution of noneconomic damage payment in medical malpractice
claims with indemnity payments > $250,000 (nominal) by stages of dispositiona
All Med Mal Claims with
Bodily Injury Payments > $ 250,000 (nominal)
Fraction of Mean Fraction of
Cases with Noneconomic Payment for
Noneconomic Damages Noneconomic
Stage of disposition Damage Payment Payment Damages N
Pre-suit settlement 0.38 46,599 0.25 1,459
Post-suit & pre-verdict settlement 0.32 107,134 0.20 16,888
Full trial 0.32 290,526 0.21 487
All stages 0.33 107,187 0.20 18,834
Med Mal Claims with Positive
Noneconomic Damages Payment
Mean Median Fraction of
Noneconomic Noneconomic Payment for
Damages Damages Noneconomic
Stage of disposition Payment Payment Damages N
Pre-suit settlement 121,625 50,000 0.65 559
Post-suit & pre-verdict settlement 331,855 130,000 0.61 5,452
Full trial 895,481 300,410 0.64 559
All stages 327,241 120,000 0.61 6,169
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability In-
surance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for medical malpractice claims with indemnity
payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value.
a. All dollar values are in 2008 $ . Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are
exclude; duplicate reports filed in different years are not identified and eliminated.
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the fraction with noneconomic damages and the percentage role of noneconomic damages, pre-
suit settlement represents the leading category. But post-suit and pre-verdict settlement and
full trial are not far behind. In terms of absolute dollar amounts, full trial represents by far the
most extreme outlier.
Because post-suit and pre-verdict settlements represent nearly 90 percent of the cases in
the med mal sample reported in Table 4, the regression results (Table 6) for this subsample
are consistent with those described earlier. The results for pre-suit settlements and full trial
are similar to the earlier findings, but the overall results are much weaker due to sample size
limitations. The economic loss variable has a significant positive effect across all six regressions.
For cases went through full trial fatalities display a significantly negative effect on the probability
of receiving noneconomic damages and on their level, whereas in earlier stages of disposition
fatalities have a positive effect.
6.2 Court awards
Various aspects of the litigation process, such as trial and appeal costs, litigants’ risk aversion,
and asymmetric information about trial and appeal outcomes, influence the plaintiff’s bargain-
ing position vis-a`-vis the defendant in pretrial and post-verdict negotiations and induce the
settlement amount (pretrial or post-verdict) to deviate from the court award.35 In this section,
I investigate the pattern of variation in court awards for cases taken to verdict and assess the
extent to which the determinants of awards are similar to those of actual payments in the med
mal sample.
Table 7 reports the distribution of noneconomic damage awards for the mix of cases that went
through full trial. Together with the statistics in Table 2, the data suggest that noneconomic
damage awards are, on average, considerable higher than the actual payments. For all injury
categories the mean noneconomic damages awards is $ 984,370, as compared to the mean payout
of $ 107,187. The third column of statistics in Table 7 shows that for all injury categories
noneconomic damages awards comprise 43 percent of total damage awards in plaintiff verdict
cases, as compared to the mean fraction of payment of 20 percent. The differences between the
median awards and the median payments are similar to those between the means.
Tables 8 reports regression results. The explanatory variables are the same as before except
that the economic and noneconomic damages variables are awards rather than payouts. The
regression results are similar to the earlier findings in that the economic damages variable and
elderly age are consequential. But the other coefficients are not statistically significant, in part
because of the dramatically reduced sample size (487). As a final note on this regression, the
35See supra note 9. Other factors that bring about gaps between court award and post-verdict payout may
include high-low agreements, damage caps, insurance policy limits and remittitur. See Hyman et al. (2007) for an
empirical analysis on the influences of some of these factors. See Spier et al. (2009) for a description of high-low
agreements and theoretical analysis of its effect on the difference between court award and post-verdict payout.
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Table 6. Estimates of noneconomic damage payment equations for medical malpractice claims by stages of dispositiona
Pre-suit Settlement Post-suit & Pre-verdict Settlement Full Trial
(N = 1, 459) (N = 16, 888) (N = 487)
INCIDENCE OF Log(AMOUNT OF INCIDENCE OF Log(AMOUNT OF INCIDENCE OF Log(AMOUNT OF
NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC
DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAGE DAMAGE
PAYMENT PAYMENT+1) PAYMENT PAYMENT + 1) PAYMENT PAYMENT + 1)
Variable
Log(ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT +1) 0.347∗∗ 1.575∗∗ 0.320∗∗ 1.687∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 1.688∗∗
(0.015) (0.047) (0.004) (0.015) (0.014) (0.113)
EMPLOYED 0.017 −0.150 −0.170∗∗ −0.953∗∗ −0.169 −1.499
(0.131) (0.480) (0.040) (0.158) (0.185) (1.289)
Children 0.227 0.575 0.032 0.050 0.049 0.519
(0.192) (0.729) (0.054) (0.218) (0.264) (1.800)
Elderly 0.474∗∗ 1.756∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.260 0.231 1.556
(0.129) (0.483) (0.039) (0.159) (0.185) (1.283)
Physicians and surgeons −0.230 −1.170 −0.244∗∗ −1.207∗∗ −0.338 −1.261
(0.254) (0.930) (0.079) (0.310) (0.467) (2.854)
Hospital 0.332 1.141 0.458∗∗ 1.608∗∗ −0.102 0.584
(0.255) (0.942) (0.084) (0.334) (0.496) (3.039)
Nursing home −0.247 −0.920 −0.067 −0.004 −0.051 0.462
(0.302) (1.129) (0.102) (0.412) (0.591) (3.852)
Fatalities 0.049 0.298 0.106∗∗ 0.717∗∗ −0.399∗ −2.466†
(0.128) (0.486) (0.035) (0.144) (0.187) (1.312)
Nonfatal serious injuries −0.593∗ −2.345∗ −0.360∗∗ −1.845∗∗ −0.234 −2.211
(0.295) (1.009) (0.057) (0.211) (0.252) (1.632)
Constant −1.519∗∗ −5.834∗∗ −1.403∗∗ −6.458∗∗ −0.930† −7.803∗
(0.267) (1.017) (0.084) (0.354) (0.489) (3.131)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6493 0.2394 0.6752 0.2721 0.4853 0.1866
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Omitted age group is adult non-elderly; Omitted defendant type is other defendants. Omitted injury type is other
non-fatal injuries. † significant at 10 percent level; * significant at 5 percent level; ** significant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for medical
malpractice claims with indemnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are exclude; duplicate
reports filed in different years are not identified and eliminated.
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics: Overall distribution of noneconomic damages awards in medical malpractice cases went through full triala
All Court-Adjudicated Cases Court-Adjudicated Cases with Positive
with Bodily Injury Payments > $ 250,000 (nominal) Noneconomic Damages Awards
Fraction of Mean Fraction of Mean Median Fraction of
Cases with Noneconomic Payment for Noneconomic Noneconomic Payment for
Noneconomic Damages Noneconomic Damages Damages Noneconomic
Type of Injury Damages Awards Awards Damages Observations Awards Awards Damages Observations
Death 0.84 1,200,683 0.51 126 1,427,228 621,214 0.61 106
Amputation 0.83 3,051,703 0.49 12 3,662,044 894,614 0.59 10
Burns (heat) 0.56 109,055 0.36 9 196,300 185,000 0.65 5
Burns (chemical) 0.83 170,376 0.42 6 204,452 132,290 0.51 5
Systemic poisoning (toxic) - - - 0 - - - 0
Systemic poisoning (other) 1.00 4,961 0.07 1 4,961 4,961 0.07 1
Eye injury (blindness) 0.95 596,762 0.54 19 629,916 564,990 0.57 18
Respiratory condition 0.75 562,280 0.21 4 749,707 352,959 0.29 3
Nervous condition 0.80 1,474,385 0.59 5 1,842,981 674,791 0.74 4
Hearing loss or impairment 1.00 2,990,389 0.38 6 2,990,389 3,511,897 0.38 6
Circulatory condition 0.78 393,151 0.45 9 505,480 488,372 0.57 7
Multiple injuries 0.86 263,088 0.45 14 306,936 123,195 0.53 12
Back injury 0.83 490,164 0.32 18 588,197 161,072 0.38 15
Skin disorder 0.40 114,072 0.25 5 285,180 285,180 0.63 2
Brain damage 0.83 2,014,420 0.24 47 2,427,635 1,708,751 0.29 39
Scarring 0.87 609,932 0.46 23 701,422 178,244 0.53 20
Spinal cord injuries 0.90 992,124 0.29 10 1,102,360 508,216 0.32 9
Other 0.80 830,732 0.42 194 1,033,090 286,784 0.52 156
All injury types 0.82 984,370 0.43 487 1,206,994 390,257 0.53 367
a. All dollar values are in 2008$ . Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are exclude; duplicate reports filed in different years are not identified
and eliminated. -: no cases in this cell
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for claims with
indemnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are exclude; duplicate reports filed in different
years are not identified and eliminated.
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Table 8. Estimates of noneconomic damages awards equations for med mal cases went through full triala
Probit Tobit
INCIDENCE OF Log(1+ AMOUNT OF
NONECONOMIC NONECONOMIC
Independent DAMAGE AWARD DAMAGE AWARD)
Variable (N = 487) (N = 487)




















Pseudo R-Squared 0.0899 0.0213
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Omitted age group is adult non-elderly; Omitted defendant
type is other defendants. Omitted injury type is non-fatal serious injuries. * significant at 5 percent level;
** significant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance
Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for court-adjudicated medical malpractice claims with in-
demnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in
the same year are exclude; duplicate reports filed in different years are not identified and eliminated.
Log(ECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARD +1) coefficient in the noneconomic damage awards level
equation is only 0.45 so that the elasticity of noneconomic damage award with economic damage
award levels is less than one. This is at odds with the earlier results where payment for noneco-
nomic losses increases more than proportionally with payment for economic losses (Tables 4
and 6). To the extent that economic damage award reflects the severity of injury, this result
might suggest that courts tend to under-compensate victims with more severe injuries for their
noneconomic harm.
7 Compensation for Different Types of Insurance Claims
The context in which an injury occurs may influence the emotional distress that a victim ex-
periences and therefore the compensation that she commands and receives. For instance, being
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injured in a special relationship (e.g., doctor-patient) might bring about more pain and suffering
than being injured by a stranger (e.g., a pedestrian being injured by a driver).36 In this section,
I briefly describe the exercises that I conducted to examine the extent to which the determinants
of noneconomic damages are similar across different contexts of bodily injury.
The TDI database includes closed claim reports for bodily injury covered by five lines of com-
mercial insurance: Besides medical malpractice liability, general liability, auto liability, multi-
peril, and other professional liability are also reported. For the non-medical malpractice cases,
I rely on the insurance type to identify the type of claim, except that (i) I remove any medical
malpractice cases; and (ii) following Black et al. (2008), I treat cases that are paid under medical
professional liability insurance but are not medical malpractice cases (e.g., cases against dentists
and oral surgeons) as “other professional liability” cases. Furthermore, in a similar way as in
the case of medical malpractice claims I restrict to “Long Form” reports and eliminate duplicate
reports of the same year.37 Because of these restrictions, the resulting sample of 97,447 claims
contains 25,722 general liability claims, 53,380 auto liability claims, 16,473 multiperil liability
claims and 1,872 other professional liability claims. I refer to the sample of 97,447 non-medical
malpractice claims and 18,834 medical malpractice claims as my all areas sample.
Table 9 provides summary statistics for each area. For claims for which there was an indem-
nity payment of at least $25,000 but not necessarily a noneconomic damage component, general
liability represents the leading category in terms of the fraction with noneconomic damage pay-
ments and percentage role of noneconomic damage payments. Medical malpractice and auto
liability are not far behind in terms of the share of the payments comprised by noneconomic
damages. In terms of absolute dollar amounts, medical malpractice represents by far the most
extreme outlier.
The statistics in the final columns of Table 9 present the noneconomic damages contribution
excluding cases where noneconomic damage payments are zero. Medical malpractice received
nearly double the mean level of noneconomic damages received by product liability and more
than double the mean levels of noneconomic damages received by the other insurance categories.
Results for median noneconomic damages are similar. One may conclude therefore, based on
the magnitudes of payments observed, that noneconomic damages for medical malpractice are
much larger, in absolute terms, than for non-medical malpractice claims.
However, a quite different perspective is offered by the statistics in the second-last column of
Table 9. With an average share of noneconomic damages of 61 percent, medical malpractice con-
tinues to represent the leading claim type in situations in which noneconomic damage payments
are positive. The other areas are not far behind, however, as for the non-medical malpractice
cases noneconomic damages comprise from 55 to 57 percent of all payments in situations in
which there is positive noneconomic damage compensation. One may conclude therefore, based
36Avraham (2006) makes a similar argument.
37Black et al. (2008) estimated that for non-medical malpractice claims only 2% of the reports are duplicates.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics: Overall distribution of noneconomic damage payment in claims with indemnity payments > $250,000 (nominal)a
All Claims with Claims with Positive
Bodily Injury Payments > $ 250,000 (nominal) Noneconomic Damages Payment
Fraction of Mean Fraction of Mean Median Fraction of
Cases with Noneconomic Payment for Noneconomic Noneconomic Payment for
Noneconomic Damages Noneconomic Damages Damages Noneconomic
Type of Injury Damage payment Payment Damages Observations Payment Payment Damages Observations
General Liability 0.37 66,648 0.21 25,722 180,720 55,918 0.57 9,486
Auto Liability 0.27 36,095 0.15 53,380 131,959 38,000 0.55 14,601
Multiperil Liability 0.36 57,246 0.20 16,473 160,322 44,097 0.55 5,882
Other Professional Liability 0.29 42,676 0.16 1,872 145,517 43,000 0.56 549
Medical Malpractice 0.33 107,187 0.20 18,834 327,241 120,000 0.61 6,169
All Areas 0.32 57,470 0.18 116,282 182,154 43,000 0.57 36,687
a. All dollar values are in 2008 $ .
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for claims with
indemnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are exclude; duplicate reports filed in different
years are not identified and eliminated.
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on the shares of payments observed, that the percentage role of noneconomic damage payment
in medical malpractice claims is similar to that in non-medical malpractice claims.
Tables 10 and 11 report regression results for particular claim type subsamples and for the
all areas sample. The explanatory variables are the same as before except for the absence of
defendant types.
The regression results show a marked similarity in predictability of noneconomic damage
payments across the different claim types: The explanatory variables account for 63 to 88 percent
of the variability in the probability of receiving noneconomic damage compensation and 25 to
49 percent of the variability in its level, respectively.
The estimates in Tables 10 and 11 also illuminate the specific factors that influence noneco-
nomic damage compensation. The effects of the individual factors are roughly consistent with
the findings in medical malpractice cases. But for multiperil liability and other professional lia-
bility claims fewer coefficients are statistically significant, in part because of the smaller sample
sizes. The two most consistently influential variables are ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT
and EMPLOYED where higher incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages are signifi-
cantly associated with higher economic damages and unemployment across all the liability types.
The primary variables of interest are the stages of case disposition. Similar to the case for med-
ical malpractice, for auto liability, multiperil and, other professional liability higher incidence
and magnitude of noneconomic damages are related to earlier stages of dispute resolution. The
exception is for general liability where cases resolved in pre-suit settlements received less noneco-
nomic damages than cases went through full trial. However, the coefficient is not statistically
significant at conventional level.
Consistent with the findings for medical malpractice, for product liability claims the age group
with the highest incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages, controlling for the effects of
other factors, is elderly individuals. In contrast, in other non-medical malpractice cases children
are more likely to receive noneconomic damages than non-elderly adults and elderly individuals,
and if they do the level of such compensation is higher.
The final columns of Tables 10 and 11 show that the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic
damages are higher in general liability cases and lower in auto liability, multiperil liability and
other professional liability cases as compared to medical malpractice cases.
8 Measures of The Efficiency of Noneconomic Loss Com-
pensation
Parties to a legal dispute generally gain by devoting resources toward proof of damages, leading
often to socially inefficient private incentives to establish damages. It is the aim of this section
to assess the efficiency in damage compensation for cases involve noneconomic losses.
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Table 10. Regression Results Explaining the Incidences of Noneconomic Damage Payment for
General Liability, Auto Liability, Multiperil, Other Professional Liability Claims and All Areasa
INCIDENCE OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT (Probit)
Other
General Liability Auto Liability Multiperil Liability Professional Liability All Areas
(N = 25, 722) (N = 53, 380) (N = 16, 473) (N = 1, 872) (N = 116, 281)
Log(ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT +1) 0.331∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.376∗∗ 0.380∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014) (0.002)
EMPLOYED −0.416∗∗ −0.256∗∗ −0.305∗∗ −0.013 −0.299∗∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.052) (0.128) (0.017)
Pre-suit settlement 0.115 1.081∗∗ 0.238 0.569 0.471∗∗
(0.103) (0.111) (0.148) (0.385) (0.056)
Post-suit & pre-judgment settlement 0.750∗∗ 0.951∗∗ 0.294∗ 0.649† 0.595∗∗
(0.098) (0.109) (0.143) (0.360) (0.055)
Children −0.263∗∗ 0.349∗∗ 0.090 0.383† 0.023
(0.055) (0.058) (0.074) (0.201) (0.028)
Elderly 0.273∗∗ −0.068† −0.056 −0.026 0.137∗∗
(0.031) (0.039) (0.057) (0.136) (0.018)
Fatalities −0.553∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 0.068 0.171 −0.033
(0.044) (0.047) (0.065) (0.143) (0.021)
Nonfatal serious injuries −0.624∗∗ −0.320∗∗ −0.230∗ −0.650 −0.480∗∗







Other Professional Liability −0.171∗∗
(0.057)
Constant −1.737∗∗ −3.316∗∗ −2.140∗∗ −2.438∗∗ −2.060∗∗
(0.101) (0.115) (0.149) (0.367) (0.058)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6389 0.8888 0.8308 0.7455 0.7678
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Omitted disposition is full trial; Omitted age group is adult non elderly; Omitted injury type is other nonfatal
injuries; Omitted insurance category for the regression in the last column is medical malpractice. †significant at 10 percent level; * significant at 5 percent level; **
significant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for claims
with indemnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are exclude; duplicate reports filed
in different years are not identified and eliminated.
28
Table 11. Regression Results Explaining the Levels of Noneconomic Damage Payment for
General Liability, Auto Liability, Multiperil, Other Professional Liability Claims and All Areasa
Log(1+ AMOUNT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT) (Tobit)
Other
General Liability Auto Liability Multiperil Liability Professional Liability All Areas
(N = 25, 722) (N = 53, 380) (N = 16, 473) (N = 1, 872) (N = 116, 281)
Log(ECONOMIC DAMAGE PAYMENT +1 +1) 1.617∗∗ 1.581∗∗ 1.570∗∗ 1.745∗∗ 1.662∗∗
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.045) (0.005)
EMPLOYED −2.092∗∗ −0.644∗∗ −0.836∗∗ −0.295 −1.158∗∗
(0.122) (0.048) (0.095) (0.403) (0.046)
Pre-suit settlement −0.202 1.419∗∗ 0.233 1.026 0.817∗∗
(0.373) (0.174) (0.279) (1.192) (0.148)
Post-suit & pre-judgment settlement 2.439∗∗ 1.154∗∗ 0.342 1.501 1.204∗∗
(0.351) (0.172) (0.268) (1.102) (0.143)
Children −0.881∗∗ 0.780∗∗ 0.752∗∗ 1.234† 0.252∗∗
(0.212) (0.085) (0.139) (0.647) (0.076)
Elderly 1.515∗∗ −0.281∗∗ −0.291∗∗ −0.294 0.407∗∗
(0.126) (0.053) (0.106) (0.440) (0.049)
Fatalities −1.646∗∗ 1.549∗∗ 0.884∗∗ 0.857† 0.371∗∗
(0.158) (0.070) (0.122) (0.469) (0.059)
Nonfatal serious injuries −2.166∗∗ −0.578∗∗ −0.669∗∗ −2.526∗∗ −1.562∗∗







Other Professional Liability −0.295†
(0.161)
Constant −6.718∗∗ −6.516∗∗ −5.442∗∗ −8.417∗∗ −6.720∗∗
(0.374) (0.185) (0.291) (1.185) (0.159)
Pseudo R-Squared 0.2457 0.4902 0.4078 0.3337 0.3405
a. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Omitted disposition is full trial; Omitted age group is adult non elderly; Omitted injury type is other nonfatal
injuries; Omitted insurance category for the regression in the last column is medical malpractice. †significant at 10 percent level; * significant at 5 percent level; **
significant at 1 percent level.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-2008 for claims
with indemnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are exclude; duplicate reports filed
in different years are not identified and eliminated.
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For the sample of 18,834 medical malpractice claims in the TDI database, there is information
on whether the plaintiff retained an attorney as well as on the defendant’s legal costs. With
reasonable assumptions it is possible to calculate the role of legal costs relative to the net payment
amount received by claimants. Analysis of all claims, not simply those in which a suit was filed,
might lead to a lower estimate of the magnitude of transactions costs. For purposes of these
calculations, I assume that for plaintiffs who retained an attorney the plaintiff’s legal costs are
one-third of the total damage payment she receives, which is consistent with available empirical
evidence.38 98% of plaintiffs in the med mal sample retained an attorney. For plaintiffs who did
not retain an attorney I assume that the plaintiff’s legal costs are zero. These cost estimates
might understate the actual costs as they do not include and out-of-pocket expenses and the
value of plaintiff’s time.
Let π denote the level of insurer payment. Let cp (resp. cd) denote the legal costs incurred by
the plaintiff (resp. defendant). The first measure of efficiency is given by the damage payments





This measure adopts the same formulation of rate-of-rent-dissipation which is a measure for
intensity of rent-seeking activities that is commonly used in the rent-seeking literature (see, e.g.,
Tullock 1980).





Both share calculations are similar to the formulations used by Kakalik and Pace (1986),
Hensler et al. (1987), Carroll et al. (2005), Hersch and Viscusi (2007) and Black et al. (2005),
(2008). These authors have used either cd/(cd + π) or (cd + cp)/(2/3)π or both as measures of
cost efficiency.
Table 12 reports the efficiency measures by different types of injury for medical malpractice
claims with noneconomic damage payments. Efficiency measures for claims without noneconomic
damage payments are included for comparison. The legal costs per net damage payment amount
for all cases with noneconomic damage payments average 0.59 and range from 0.50 to 0.71. That
is, on average, for cases involve positive noneconomic damage payments the tort system generates
transactions costs more than half of the value of the net payment received by the plaintiff. The
injury types with the lowest degree of efficiency are other injuries and spinal cord injuries, for
which the values of legal costs average 0.71 and 0.69 relative to the total damage payment to
38Hensler et al.’s (1987) study of tort litigation costs in Cook County and San Francisco notes that contingency
fees were typically one-third of the damage payment. See Hensler et al. (1987), pp. 25-26. Hersch and Viscusi
(2007) make the same assumption about the plaintiff’s legal costs when measuring the efficiency of tort liability
litigation.
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Table 12. Efficiency in Noneconomic Damages Payment by Type of Injurya
Claims with Positive Claims with No
Noneconomic Damages Payment Noneconomic Damages Payment
Total Legal Defense Total Legal Defense
Costs/Payment Expenses/Payment Observations Costs/Payment Expenses/Payment Observations
Death 0.57 0.24 2,152 0.63 0.30 4,528
Amputation 0.62 0.30 155 0.63 0.30 314
Burns (heat) 0.62 0.31 77 0.66 0.34 100
Burns (chemical) 0.54 0.22 26 0.51 0.24 50
Systemic poisoning (toxic) 0.54 0.21 26 0.79 0.47 22
Systemic poisoning (other) 0.51 0.20 39 0.73 0.39 44
Eye injury (blindness) 0.57 0.25 173 0.57 0.24 332
Respiratory condition 0.58 0.25 75 0.74 0.41 137
Nervous condition 0.66 0.34 60 0.86 0.53 85
Hearing loss or impairment 0.59 0.25 34 0.61 0.28 70
Circulatory condition 0.71 0.38 104 0.72 0.39 175
Multiple injuries 0.58 0.26 180 0.61 0.28 385
Back injury 0.69 0.35 115 0.73 0.41 342
Skin disorder 0.59 0.28 91 0.70 0.38 159
Brain damage 0.52 0.19 591 0.57 0.24 1,164
Scarring 0.62 0.30 181 0.73 0.40 272
Spinal cord injuries 0.50 0.17 128 0.60 0.28 320
Other 0.60 0.28 2,475 0.70 0.37 5,164
All Types 0.60 0.27 5,800 0.68 0.36 11,875
a. For claims in which the plaintiff retained an attorney, total legal costs/payment equal (defendant expenses + (1/3) total damage payments)/(total
payments from defendant(s) to plaintiff(s)), defense expenses/payment equal (defendant expenses)/(total payments from defendant(s) to plaintiff(s)).
For claims in which no plaintiff lawyer was used, total legal costs/payment equal transaction costs/payment and defense expenses/payment both equal
(defendant expenses)/(total payments from defendant(s) to plaintiff(s)).
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim database for the years 1988-
2008 for claims with indemnity payments of at least $25,000 in nominal value. Duplicate reports relating to the same incident in the same year are
exclude; duplicate reports filed in different years are not identified and eliminated. 1,159 cases are dropped from the med mal sample due to lack of
information on the defendants payments to in-house counsel.
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plaintiffs, respectively. These values are much higher than fatalities (0.50) and other types of
permanent, catastrophic injuries such as amputation (0.51) and brain damages (0.62).
Since only 2 percent of the plaintiffs do not retain a lawyer, the values of the damage payments
share of defense expenses are almost identical to subtracting one-third from the damage payments
shares of total legal costs.
Finally, the total legal costs for each dollar received by plaintiffs average 0.68 for claims where
noneconomic damage is not an element of compensation. The damage payments share of defense
costs averages 0.36 for claims where noneconomic damage payments are zero. These ratios are
higher than those in the cases in which noneconomic damages arise.
9 Conclusion
My results provide but a limited test of the rationality of the process by which noneconomic
damages are determined. The tort law provides no clear guidelines for the calculation of noneco-
nomic damages. Many of the noneconomic damage cap reforms have been based on a belief
that these damage compensations are entirely random. Using Texas Department of Insurance
Commercial Liability Insurance Closed Claim data for the 1988-2008 period, I provide evidence
that the tort system providing noneconomic damages is far from random. Abstracting from the
potential omitted variable bias, my evidence shows a reasonably stable and predictable relation-
ship between the characteristics of the claim and the actual outcome in the great majority of
cases that are settled informally out of court. The critiques on noneconomic damages are not
supported by the evidence.
In particular, my main finding has been that noneconomic damage payments vary quite sys-
tematically with observable characteristics of the case. These characteristics include the amount
of economic losses, whether the victim is employed, the age group to which the victim belongs,
and the type of defendant. These information are usually available at the initial stage of a
damage claim and can be used by the parties and the jury to aid the calculation of noneconomic
losses. Moreover, I have shown that the likelihood of noneconomic damage payment is signif-
icantly higher in cases resolved in earlier stages of litigation. I also provide evidence that the
determinants of noneconomic damages are remarkably similar between medical malpractice and
non-medical malpractice claims.
However, this systematic variation does not imply that no reform efforts are needed. For
instance, I have shown that the probability and size of noneconomic damage payments are
higher from “deep pocket” defendants (e.g., hospitals) than from individual defendants (e.g.,
physicians and surgeons) while controlling for other characteristics of the case. Because damage
payment in out-of-court settlement reflects the court outcome, these results suggest that when
awarding noneconomic damages the courts have objectives other than merely making whole the
victims for their physical and mental anguish.
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Furthermore, I have shown that on average, the total legal costs for each dollar received
by plaintiffs are 0.59 for claims where noneconomic damages is an element of compensation.
For cases involve noneconomic damage payments, the tort system is more efficient in awarding
damages for permanent and catastrophic injuries than for temporary, insignificant injuries. The
damage payments share of legal costs is lower for cases receiving noneconomic damages payments
than for cases receiving only economic damage payments.
Many important issues have been sidestepped, including the effects of victim’s income and
gender on the incidence and magnitude of noneconomic damages, and whether compensation
with economic damages alone could provide a simple solution to the various problems related
to noneconomic damage compensation. It would be interesting, for example, to see whether
more objective measures could be developed to reduce the uncertainty and costs associated with
noneconomic loss compensation and how policies can be designed to encourage this. Finally, it
is needed to point out that the omission of variables reflecting the victim’s income, gender and
seriousness of injury could well bias estimated coefficients on some of the variables included in
the models.
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